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One of the principal motivations of international criminal justice institutions is 
to provide victims with a sense that justice has been done. Many believe that the best 
way to accomplish this is to put on trial those individuals accused of committing 
international crimes. One barrier to providing victims with justice through trials has 
been the general unwillingness of international and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals to try individuals in their absence. However, sentiment is growing in 
favour of holding trials regardless of whether the accused is present. This is evidenced 
by the decision to permit trials in absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the 
addition of Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater to the International Criminal 
Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, all of which allow some portion of the trial 
to take place in the absence of the accused. This change in approach to trials in 
absentia raises a novel question for international criminal law: do trials conducted in 
the absence of the accused still provide the victims of atrocity crimes with the sense 
that justice has been done? 
This article will examine whether international criminal trials can adequately 
fulfil the interests of the victims without the full participation of the accused. First, it 
will discuss what justice for the victims of atrocity crimes means in the context of an 
international criminal trial. It does this by identifying the three outcomes most 
commentators believe provide the victims with a sense that justice has been done. 
Next, it will define the accused’s right to be present at trial and discuss what the right 
is meant to protect. The article will then individually examine those three outcomes 
and determine whether they can be accomplished in the accused’s absence. The article 
concludes that trials conducted without the accused being present do not meet all of 
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the needs of victims and therefore those needs should not act as justification to limit 
the accused’s right to be present. 
2. Justice for the Victims of Atrocity Crimes 
 Delivering justice to the victims of atrocity crimes has been described as the 
most important function performed by international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals and is a defining purpose of the International Criminal Court.1 A 
victim, as defined by the International Criminal Court, is a person that fits each of the 
following four criteria: 1) they are a natural or legal person; 2) who has suffered 
harm; 3) caused by the commission of a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court; and 4) a causal nexus exists between the harm suffered 
and the crime. 2  Numerous different actors within international human rights and 
international criminal justice institutions have confirmed that victims are increasingly 
a focal point of international criminal law.3 The International Criminal Court was 
designed from its inception to ensure that the interests of the victims played a 
prominent role. At the opening of the Rome Conference, then United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the delegates to develop a Statute in which ‘the 
overriding interest must be that of the victims, and of the international community as 
a whole.’4 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the first prosecutor at the International Criminal 
                                                        
1 L. E. Fletcher, ‘Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International 
Criminal Court’, in C. de Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 302. 
2 Order for Reparations Pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, Katanga (ICC-01/04-
01/07) Trial Chamber II, 24 March 2017, at § 36; citing Judgment on the Appeals of 
the Prosecutor and the Defence Against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victim 
Participation of 18 January 2008, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Appeals Chamber, 11 
July 2008, at §§ 61-65. 
3 Fletcher, supra note 1, at 307. 
4 UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court 
Conference Must be that of Victims and World Community as a Whole, UN Doc. 
SG/SM/6597 L/2871, 15 June 1998. 
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Court, described his mandate as delivering ‘justice for the victims.’5 That position 
was reiterated by his successor, Fatou Bensouda, who feels that the prosecutor’s 
responsibility is to investigate and try alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes, ‘where 
no-one else is doing justice for the victims.’ 6  The importance of vindicating the 
interests of the victims was also confirmed by former International Criminal Court 
president, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, when he stated of the Court, we ‘must not let down 
the countless victims around the world that place their hope in this institution.’7  
 The International Criminal Court’s focus on the interests of the victims is not 
unique. Other international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have 
also demonstrated the importance of helping the victims of atrocity crimes. Antonio 
Cassese, in his capacity as the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, described protecting victims as ‘the raison d’être’ of the 
Tribunal.8  In 2011, the president of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Khalida Rachid Khan referred to ‘seeking justice for the victims’ as the driving force 
behind the Tribunal’s goal of ensuring the non-reoccurrence of similar atrocities.9 At 
the opening of the eighth plenary meeting of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, President Judge Kong Srim observed that it was important to 
                                                        
5 ICC Prosecutor visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia, ICC Doc. ICC-CPI-20080509-
MA13, 9 May 2008. 
6 Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mrs Fatou 
Bensouda, 22 October 2012, available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otpstatement221012, last visited on 14 August 2018. 
7 ICC launches commemorations for 17 July – International Criminal Justice Day, 
ICC Doc. ICC-CPI-20120706-PR822, 6 July 2012. 
8 A. Cassese, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Human Rights’, 1997(4) European Human Rights Law Review (1997) 329-52, at 331 
9 Sixteenth annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, UN Doc. 
S/2011/472, 29 July 2011, at § 89. 
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reconfirm their commitment to the Extraordinary Chambers’ mission, ‘in order to 
expeditiously and effectively deliver justice to all victims’ in Cambodia.’ 10  
Emmanuel Ayoola, former President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, described 
the Special Court’s mission as ‘to bring justice to the victims of the war in Sierra 
Leone.’11 The Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon identifies 
‘bringing justice to victims’ as one of the three parts of its mandate, and the President 
of the Tribunal asserted that all of the organs of the Tribunal are working towards 
‘vindicat[ing]…the rights of the victims and the punishment of the authors of very 
serious misdeeds’. 12  Further, in 2011, the prosecutors of all of the existing 
international criminal courts and tribunals released a joint statement underlining the 
importance of effectively and expeditiously completing their missions ‘on behalf of 
the victims in the affected communities’.13 Clearly, numerous different organs of the 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals prioritize delivering 
justice to the victims of atrocity crimes even in the absence of an explicit statutory 
requirement to do so. 
 Despite the fact that many international criminal law institutions identify 
providing justice to the victims of atrocity crimes as their most important function, 
                                                        
10 Opening Speech by the Plenary’s President Judge Kong Srim, During the 8th 
Plenary of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) on 13th 
September 2010, 13 September 2010, available online at 
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/documents/public-affair/opening-speech-plenary39s-president-
judge-kong-srim-during-8th-plenary-extra, last visited on 14 August 2018, at 3. 
11 Second Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2005, 
available online at www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt2.pdf, last visited on 14 August 
2018, at 3. 
12 First Annual Report of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 2010, available online at 
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-memoranda/226-
Annual-Report-2009-2010, last visited on 14 August 2018, at §§ 166, 246. 
13 Joint Statement, Sixth Colloquium of International Prosecutors, 15 May 2011, 
available online at 
www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/Colloquium_Joint_Statement.pdf, last visited 
on 14 August 2018. 
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none of them substantively address what justice for the victims means in this context. 
Commentators have attempted to fill this gap by suggesting that the right to an 
effective remedy designed to eliminate the effect of the harm caused by the 
commission of the crime constitutes justice for the victims. 14  Realistically, it is 
probably impossible to fashion any true remedy for victims. The scope of the crimes 
committed against them and their suffering as a result of those crimes is simply too 
great. Regardless, attempts should still be made to acknowledge their victimhood and 
provide them with some form of redress. 15  While many different things might 
contribute to forming an adequate remedy, there are three primary components that 
must almost always be present. They are: developing a truthful record of events; 
establishing accountability for the crimes committed; and providing the victims with 
reparations.16  
3. The Accused’s Right to be Present at Trial 
 Providing victims with truth, accountability and reparations is made much 
easier when the accused is present during his or her trial. At one time this was a non-
issue in international criminal law, as it was thought that the accused’s right to be 
present at trial meant that international criminal trials could only take place in the 
presence of the accused. The presence of the accused at trial is considered ‘an 
essential element of procedural equality’ that gives meaning to the principle that 
‘criminal defendants are legally entitled to be personally present at their own trials.’17 
                                                        
14 L. Moffett, Justice for Victims Before the International Criminal Court, (Abingdon 
(UK): Routledge 2014), at 30-1; citing D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 7, 35-6. 
15 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Assessing Conflict Outcomes: Accountability and Impunity’, in 
M. C. Bassiouni (ed), The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study 
on Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice, vol 1 (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2010), at 20. 
16 Ibid at 33-4. 
17 R. May and M. Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Ardsley, NY (USA): 
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One reason it is important for the accused to be present during trial is to give him or 
her the opportunity to participate in, and understand, the proceedings against them, 
particularly during the presentation and examination of the evidence.18 Generally, the 
accused should be present throughout the entirety of the proceedings so that he or she 
can exercise other fair trial rights, including: assisting in his or her own defence; 
consulting, and in some cases selecting, his or her own counsel; confronting the 
witnesses or the evidence presented against him or her; and testifying on his or her 
own behalf at trial.19  
 The accused’s right to be present at trial is a qualified right. It allows the 
accused to choose whether he or she would like to attend trial, and carries with it an 
attendant duty imposed on international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals preventing them from excluding the accused without his or her consent.20 
The right to be present can be waived voluntarily so long as the accused has sufficient 
notice of the proceedings that will permit him or her to make an informed decision not 
to appear.21 The physical presence of the accused is not sufficient to comply with the 
right to be present, he or she must also have the ability to understand and participate 
in the proceedings.22 As a result, a violation of the right to be present occurs when the 
trial is conducted in such a way as to limit the accused’s ability to participate in 
                                                                                                                                                              
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002) 280; N. Cohen, ‘Trial in Absentia Re-
Examined’, 40(2) Tennessee Law Review (1973) 155-194, at 156. 
18 S. J. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedure Tradition and the 
European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), at 117; F. Cassim, 
‘The Accused’s Right to be Present: A Key to Meaningful Participation in the 
Criminal Process’ (2005) 38 Comparative & International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa 285-303, at 285-6. 
19 D. A. Mundis, ‘Current Developments: Improving the Operation and Functioning 
of the International Criminal Tribunals’, 94 American Journal of International Law 
(2000) 759-773, at 761. 
20 C. H. Wheeler, The Right To Be Present At Trial In International Criminal Law 
(Leiden: Brill 2018), at 7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Summers, supra note 18, at 113. 
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proceedings ‘and he or she has not affirmatively authorized that limitation.’23 
 The term trial in absentia has no set meaning in international criminal law, 
and is often used to describe many different factual scenarios involving an accused’s 
absence from trial.24 There are four different types of absences from trial: 1) trial in 
absentia; 2) trial by default; 3) absence occurring after trial has commenced; and 4) 
absence resulting from an inability to understand or participate in trial.25 There can be 
some overlap between these categories, and room exists within the categories 
themselves for further specificity. The first two types of absences, trial in absentia 
and trial by default, involve the entire trial being held in the absence of the accused. 
The latter two types of absences, those occurring after trial has begun and those 
resulting from an inability to understand or participate in proceedings, generally 
involve a defendant that is physically present in the courtroom for at least some part 
of the proceedings. Many international and internationalised courts and tribunals do 
not allow trials in absentia or trials by default, although all international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals permit parts of the trial to occur outside 
of the accused’s presence.  
 The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone all largely copied Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights by describing the presence of the accused during trial as being one of 
                                                        
23 Wheeler, supra note 20, at 7.  
24 S. Starygin and J. Selth, ‘Cambodia and the Right to be Present: Trials In Absentia 
in the Draft Criminal Procedure Code’ Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2005] 
170-188, at 185; C. Jenks, ‘Notice Otherwise Given: Will In Absentia Trials at the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights?’, 33 Fordham International 
Law Journal (Fordham ILJ) (2009) 57-100, at 68; N. Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in 
Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in Case of a State’s 
Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’, 8(5) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (JICJ) (2010) 1307-1321, at 1309. 
25 Wheeler, supra note 20, at 104. 
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the minimum guarantees of a fair trial. 26  Additionally, the requirement found in 
Article 63(1) of the International Criminal Court’s Statute that ‘[t]he accused shall be 
present for trial’ was interpreted as an indication that the international legal 
community had rejected trials in absentia.27 However, the introduction of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute in 2007, which explicitly allows the accused to be 
tried in absentia, heralded a radical change in thinking about the role of trials in 
absentia in international criminal law. 28  This was followed in 2013 by the 
International Criminal Court’s enactment of Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater, all 
of which allow trial to continue outside of the physical presence of the accused.29 
These changes have made it increasingly clear that international criminal law does 
permit at least some form of in absentia proceedings. What remains unclear is 
whether the three elements that constitute a remedy for the victims of atrocity crimes 
can be fulfilled without the direct participation of the accused. 
4. Can Justice be Achieved in the Absence of the Accused? 
 For in absentia trials to have any real purpose in the context of international 
criminal law they must produce some benefit, and preferably one that outweighs the 
diminution of the accused’s fair trial rights that necessarily accompanies a trial in 
absentia. The victims of the alleged crimes for which the absent accused is being 
prosecuted are the ideal beneficiaries of that prospective benefit. The value of that 
benefit may in part depend on the extent of the accused’s absence from their trial. An 
accused that is absent from the entirety of the trial is unable to contribute to restoring 
the victims’ sense of justice. In contrast, an accused that is only absent for part of the 
                                                        
26 Art. 14 ICCPR; Art. 21(d)(4) ICTYSt.; Art. 20(d)(4) ICTRSt.; Art. 17(4)(d) 
SCSLSt. 
27 Starygin and Selth, supra note 24, at 185. 
28 Art 22 STLSt. 
29 Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater ICC RPE.  
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trial may still help enable the realization of this goal. The International Criminal 
Court recognized this in Prosecutor v Ruto et al. Trial Chamber V(A) authorised 
William Ruto’s limited absence from trial so that he could attend to some of his 
official duties as Deputy President of Kenya but also mandated that Ruto be present 
whenever the victims presented their views and concerns in person so as to force him 
to confront the very human face of his actions. 30 This process of permitting the 
victims to directly confront the people allegedly responsible for their injuries is seen 
by some as having a positive therapeutic effect that can help the victims recover from 
the mental trauma of the crimes committed against them.31  
 The desire to provide the victims with a benefit must always be balanced 
against the need to provide the accused with a fair trial. It is generally agreed that the 
accused should only be convicted if his or her trial meets certain basic fair trial 
standards and a conviction obtained without meeting those standards of fair trial 
constitutes an injustice.32 Article 64(2) of the International Criminal Court’s Statute 
mandates that the Trial Chamber in a particular case shall ensure that ‘a trial is fair 
and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and 
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.’33 This instruction has been 
interpreted to mean that the interests of the accused must take precedence over those 
                                                        
30 Reasons for the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial under Rule 134quater, 
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11) Trial Chamber V(A), 18 February 2014, at § 79.   
31 E. Stover, ‘Witnesses and the Promise of Justice in the Hague’, in E. Stover and H. 
M. Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the 
Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 118; 
F.-X. Nsanzuwera, ‘The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation’, 3(4) JICJ 
(2005) 944-949, at 947. 
32 L. Douglas, ‘Truth and Justice in Atrocity Trials’, in W. A. Schabas (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), at 
35. 
33 Art 64(2) ICCSt. 
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of the victims when the two conflict.34 Prioritising the fair trial rights of the accused 
also underpins the declaration in Article 68(3) that victim participation must not be 
‘prejudicial to or inconsistent with’ the rights of the accused.35 However, others have 
reinforced the significance of the rights of the victims and the important role that 
being heard plays in their psychological healing process. 36  Perhaps the best way 
forward is to prioritize establishing the truth about an incident subject to the proviso 
that all decisions should be guided by what in practice will produce the most fair and 
impartial trial possible.37 
 A. Establishing the Truth 
 Establishing the truth has been identified as ‘the cornerstone of the rule of 
law’ and different international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
have consistently identified the important role truth-finding plays in their missions.38 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated in 2006 that 
victims have a ‘right to truth’, entitling them to learn: ‘the full and complete truth’ 
about relevant events and the circumstances in which they occurred; the identities of 
                                                        
34 J. Williams, ‘Slobodan Milosevic and the Guarantee of Self-Representation’, 32(2) 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2007) 553-602, at 574; citing J. L. Falvey Jr, 
‘United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’, 19 Fordham ILJ (1995) 475-528, at 487. 
35 A. Pues, ‘A Victim’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court: 
Reflections on Article 68(3)’, 13(5) JICJ (2015) 951-972, at 958; see also Art 68(3) 
ICCSt. 
36 M. Thieroff and E. A. Amley, Jr., ‘Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the 
Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 
61’, 23 Yale Journal of International Law (1998) 231-74, at 247; citing Prosecutor 
Richard Goldstone’s Opening Statement in Rule 61 Hearing Transcript, Nikolić (IT-
94-2-R61) Trial Chamber, 9 October 1995, at 60-1. 
37 M. A. Anyah, ‘Balancing the Rights of the Accused with Rights of Victims Before 
the International Criminal Court’, in T. Mariniello (ed.), The International Criminal 
Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Abingdon (UK): Routledge, 2015), at 80. 
38 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth 
Security Council Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.3217, 25 May 1993, at 12. 
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the participants; and the reasons for the occurrence of the events. 39  The truth 
established by a court or tribunal is believed to serve multiple purposes, including: 
identifying an objective record of events; undermining denials about the existence of 
human rights violations; supplying therapeutic benefits to the accused; and the 
traditional legal function of creating a factual basis upon which the fact-finder can 
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.40 This makes the search for truth an 
overarching goal enabling the fulfilment of other victim-oriented purposes for trial.  
The importance to victims of establishing the truth cannot be overstated. As the 
representative for the Office of Public Counsel for Victims at the International 
Criminal Court stated during closing statements in the Lubanga trial, ‘the essential 
concern of the victims participating in this trial, over and beyond the conviction of the 
accused, is therefore to contribute to the establishment of the truth, seeking for the 
truth and establishing the truth.’41   
 The truth-telling process undertaken during trial must fully comply with the 
rights of the accused.42 A court’s ability to properly determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused is threatened when the two are allowed to diverge, which in turn could 
lead to punishment being imposed on an improper basis. 43  When the accused is 
convicted by way of a compromised procedure it can impact the legitimacy of 
                                                        
39 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to Truth: Report of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 February 2006, § 59; see also Decision on the Set of Procedural 
Rights Attached to the Procedural Status as Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07) Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 May 2008, §§ 31-2. 
40 G. Werle and F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3rd edn., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 38; D. Mendeloff, ‘Trauma and 
Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict 
Justice’, 31 Human Rights Quarterly (2009) 592-623, at 593. 
41 Trial Transcript, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Trial Chamber I, 25 August 2011, at 
62, lines 2-5. 
42 S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. The Rights of the Accused’, 8(1) JICJ (2010) 
137-164, at 145. 
43 Ibid. 
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international criminal law as a whole. The victims also do not benefit from a less than 
stringent approach to truth-telling. Victims only experience justice through truth-
telling if the person or people who committed the crimes against them are convicted 
during trial. When the truth-telling process is compromised and fails to identify the 
correct culprits, the victims will continue to be deprived of justice. 
 Establishing the ‘full and complete truth’ is largely impossible when the 
accused is not present during the trial. Certain information is often only known to the 
accused and it cannot be introduced into evidence if he or she is absent. That 
information is left undisclosed when the accused is tried in absentia and the goal of 
establishing the full and complete truth remains unmet. Additionally, international 
and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals rarely establish, or attempt to 
establish, the full and complete truth about a situation, irrespective of the accused’s 
presence during trial. Truth developed in the context of a trial is limited to those facts 
that are relevant to the charges brought against the accused, and do not encompass 
other facts that might be relevant to the victims. 44 Little or no evidence will be 
introduced at trial relating to issues that do not directly relate to the crimes for which 
the accused has been charged, or to aspects of the prosecution’s case that are 
uncontested.45 International criminal law has also seen a concerted effort to prevent 
the introduction of evidence about crimes not being adjudicated. The Nuremberg 
Tribunal did not acknowledge Allied crimes committed during the Second World 
War.46 The Tokyo Tribunal also refused to consider alleged Allied crimes committed 
                                                        
44 E. Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of 
Hope over Experience’, in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds.), The 
Permanent International Criminal Court, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 325. 
45 Ibid. 
46 V. Peskin, ‘Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, 4(2) 
Journal of Human Rights (2005) 213-31, at 214. 
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against the Japanese, and it did not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito for his actions 
during the war. 47  This problem has continued in the modern international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, responding to pressure from the Rwandan government, made no real 
effort to properly investigate and prosecute crimes committed by members of the 
Tutsi ethnic group.48 Trials in Iraq did not involve charges against foreign actors, 
including the United Nations, the United States and other Arab countries, for their 
perceived support of, or lack of intervention in, the human rights violations that were 
committed against the victims.49 Many Serbians believe that NATO should have been 
held accountable for their actions during the war in the former Yugoslavia. 50 
Similarly, interviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina are disappointed that no effort was 
made to determine the responsibility of the government of the Netherlands for its 
involvement in the Srebrenica genocide.51 The failure to investigate or prosecute all 
of the crimes allegedly committed during these different situations signifies a tacit 
acceptance that no attempt would be made to establish the full and complete truth. 
 There are also factual matters about which criminal courts are not equipped to 
inquire. Incidents take place during conflicts that are unlikely to be the subject of 
court proceedings, but the details of which are part of the full and complete truth 
about the larger situation. Instances of this can include the failure to provide warnings 
                                                        
47 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 311. 
48 Peskin, supra note 46, at 224-5; M. A. Fairlie, ‘Due Process Erosion: The 
Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY’, 34(1) California Western International 
Law Journal (2003) 47-83, at 57-8.  
49 Human Rights Center, Iraqi Voices: Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice and 
Social Reconstruction (Berkeley: UC Berkeley School of Law, 2004), at 29-31. 
50 V. Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 33-4; R. Steinke, The Politics of International 
Criminal Justice: German Perspectives from Nuremberg to the Hague (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012), at 16. 
51 J. N. Clark, ‘The Limits of Retributive Justice’, 7(3) JICJ (2009) 463-487, at 472. 
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of impending attacks, perceived refusals to prevent harm, and not supplying 
information about where the bodies of missing people are buried.52  These sorts of 
actions, or inactions, are not crimes as defined by the International Criminal Court’s 
Statute, and therefore it is not an appropriate forum for establishing the truth about 
these matters. Moreover, these are situations that demand an open communal dialogue 
about the issues that are dividing the community, not a determination of guilt or 
innocence, making a court the wrong environment in which to confront these issues.53 
However, they are also issues that are part of the full and complete truth. 
 Overall, the international community has been willing to accept international 
criminal trials that establish a less than complete version of the truth. Some 
commentators have also argued that victims of atrocity crimes do not require a full 
accounting of the truth. It has been suggested that victims are not really interested in 
what happened in a given situation, but are instead concerned with why it happened 
and who is responsible. 54  This argument implies the need for a less robust 
investigation into the entire truth about the situation under consideration, as the only 
facts needed are those necessary to apportion responsibility. The difficulty with this 
position is that it does not properly account for the sort of information victims of 
atrocity crimes have specifically identified as being essential to aiding in their own 
psychological healing. Individuals affected by atrocity crimes have specifically linked 
their ability to heal to the development of a more complete version of the truth about 
the situation that resulted in their victimisation. In 2011, ninety-three per cent of 
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Cambodians interviewed believed that ‘[i]t is necessary to find the truth about what 
happened during the Khmer Rouge regime.’ 55  Ninety-four per cent of Rwandans 
identified revealing ‘the truth about what happened in 1994’ as one purpose for trial, 
and over eighty per cent of respondents connected learning the truth about atrocity 
crimes to reconciliation and healing.56 Eighty-nine per cent of interviewees in the 
Central African Republic and Northern Uganda indicated that it was important to find 
out the truth about the atrocity crimes committed in their respective countries. 57 
Survey respondents in the Central African Republic agreed that finding out the truth 
was important ‘to understand why the conflict and violence happened’, ‘because the 
truth must be known’ and ‘to know who is responsible.’ 58 People from Northern 
Uganda also valued knowing the truth and specified ‘so the people will not forget’, 
‘so that history will be known’, and ‘identifying those responsible’ as reasons for 
learning the truth.59 Victims in Iraq preferred expressive reasons for establishing the 
truth, including ‘show[ing] the world the truth of what happened in Iraq’ and 
‘ensuring that future generations know what happened and what mistakes were 
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made.’60 
 These surveys are not conclusive, but they do demonstrate the importance 
victims of atrocity crimes place on establishing the truth. They also show that learning 
the truth about a situation can serve a wide variety of purposes for victims, many of 
whom demand a full and complete account of the truth. However, it is dubious 
whether such an inquiry is possible without the participation of the accused. An 
example of this can be found in the difficulty the ad hoc Tribunals had in locating the 
burial places of a number of victims murdered in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
Living victims of both conflicts have identified the importance of learning where their 
murdered loved ones are buried so that they might gain a sense of closure by knowing 
their loved ones are dead and that they received a proper burial.61 Unfortunately, it 
was impossible for the ad hoc Tribunals to conduct sufficient forensic investigations 
to establish the burial places of many of the war dead due to the sheer number of 
people killed, coupled with the secretive ways in which their bodies were disposed.62 
That left the alleged perpetrators as the only people with the knowledge necessary to 
establish information considered vital by the victims to restoring their sense of justice 
and psychological wellbeing.  
 When an accused who may be the only source of information about a 
particular issue is tried in absentia, it means that the truth cannot be established about 
those issues within his or her exclusive knowledge. This means that the victims are 
deprived of a remedy, and in turn the sense of justice, that a trial is designed to afford 
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to them. The presence of the accused is also useful to the extent that some evidence 
suggests that the truth-telling process is only effective for victims when it is 
accompanied by an apology from the perpetrators of the crimes against them.63 As a 
result, trials conducted outside of the presence of the accused often do not meet the 
needs of the victims, because such trials are incapable of establishing the full and 
complete truth necessary to meet their needs. Additionally, an absent accused is much 
less likely to apologise for his or her alleged crimes, thus depriving the victims of an 
important component of the truth-telling process. Therefore, the truth telling process, 
as currently constituted, falls short of what the victims demand to enable them to 
experience a sense of justice.  
 An accused tried in absentia is also deprived of the opportunity to have the 
full and complete truth established in the case against him or her. There are multitudes 
of ways in which a present accused can positively impact the court’s ability to 
establish the truth. He or she can instruct and consult with his or her defence counsel; 
suggest questions to be posed to witnesses during cross-examination; and testify 
before the relevant Court or Tribunal about matters that might otherwise go 
unaddressed.64 When the defendant is not present the prosecution has free rein to 
characterise the evidence in any way it chooses, to question witnesses about 
incriminating facts while ignoring exculpatory evidence, and to generally create a 
case that upon first glance appears unimpeachable. It is only through cross-
examination and the introduction of contrary evidence that the trier of fact is able to 
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develop a full and complete understanding of the truth leading to an adequate 
assessment of the guilt or innocence of the accused.  
 Trial in absentia does not meet the truth-telling needs of either the accused or 
the victims of atrocity crimes. Proceeding in the accused’s absence denies him or her 
the opportunity to adequately test the evidence presented against them and to present 
exculpatory evidence. It prevents the victims from learning about facts that they may 
consider relevant and important to fostering a sense that justice has been served. 
Trials in absentia do nothing more than promote a feeling that justice has been served 
without adequately demonstrating that it has actually been achieved. While it may not 
be possible for a trial to ever establish the full and complete truth about a situation, it 
is a much more attainable goal when trial takes place in the presence of the accused.   
 B. Accountability  
 The meaning of accountability has changed over time but it is thought that 
legal accountability, that is, the aims arising out of prosecution and conviction, must 
remain the most prominent form of accountability. 65  It is also the type of 
accountability most commonly derived from international criminal trials. Legal 
accountability, in the context of international criminal law, involves holding 
individuals responsible for violations of any crimes proscribed by the applicable 
statute.66 Legal accountability is seen as the natural counterpoint to impunity, and the 
absence of legal accountability is thought to be immoral, damaging to victims’ 
interests, in violation of international legal norms, and will lead to the recurrence of 
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atrocity crimes.67 
 Whether an accused can be held accountable in his or her absence is 
dependent on whether punishment is a necessary part of demonstrating accountability. 
An absent accused often cannot be punished even if her or she is convicted, because 
he or she is not under the control of the trial court.  There is a divergence of opinion 
about whether accountability can exist in the absence of punishment. Many 
commentators believe that punishment is an essential component of delivering justice 
to the victims.68 In particular, Jeremy Rabkin explains that punishment is necessary to 
achieve accountability because it acts as recognition that the victims have suffered a 
wrong and that society is committed to righting that wrong.69 Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia echoed this viewpoint 
when it explained that one purpose of punishment is to ‘reflect…the calls for justice 
from the persons who have been victims or suffered because of the crimes’.70   
 Victims have also emphasized the important role punishment plays in the 
realization of their own sense that justice has been done. When interviewed, many 
victims of atrocity crimes have indicated that the perpetrators of the crimes committed 
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against them should be tried and punished for their actions.71 A 2015 study conducted 
in Kenya, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo found that 
victim participants want the accused to be convicted and punished for their alleged 
crimes. 72  Individuals affected by atrocity crimes in the Central African Republic 
overwhelmingly felt that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes should be held 
accountable, and advocated in favour of a variety of punishments ranging from the 
very general ‘punishment’, to imprisonment, summary execution, and the rather 
oblique statement that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes ‘should confront justice.’73 
A survey conducted in 2002 of a randomly selected group of Rwandans determined 
that 96.8% of respondents believed it was important to try those responsible for 
committing crimes during the genocide, and 92.3% felt that the purpose of trials was 
‘to punish those who have done wrong’, although for some punishment was a 
secondary consideration to reparations in the form of compensation and forgiveness.74 
In a 2004 study conducted in Iraq, the majority of those interviewed advocated in 
favour of summary justice in the form of execution or torture without trial.75 This 
suggests that in Iraq, punishment was even more important than a finding of guilt. 
Taken together, these surveys present a compelling argument that the victims of 
atrocity crimes are particularly interested in seeing the perpetrators of those crimes 
punished for their actions. This demonstrated interest in the punishment of the 
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perpetrators also suggests that punishment is a necessary aspect of any form of 
accountability sufficient to act as a remedy for the victims of atrocity crimes. 
 Richard Goldstone points out that ‘full justice’ for victims of atrocity crimes 
means seeing the accused sentenced to an adequate punishment following his or her 
conviction. That will likely not occur when the accused is tried in his or her absence 
as he or she is not available to be punished, thus resulting in a failure to deliver full 
accountability. The victims must then determine whether partial accountability is 
sufficient to contribute to the overall remedy necessary for justice to be done. As 
William Schabas asserts, a greater sense of justice might be derived from condemning 
the perpetrators of atrocity crimes than what is accomplished through imposing 
punishment. 76 Martti Koskenniemi reiterated the sentiment that often victims do not 
expect punishment ‘but rather a recognition of the fact that what they were made to 
suffer was “wrong”, and that their moral grandeur is symbolically affirmed.’77 The 
entry of a guilty verdict or the provision of reparations could provide the recognition 
desired by victims even in the absence of punishment. Under these circumstances, the 
victims can dispute whether they have received the justice they want, but may have to 
accept that some accountability is better than none at all.  
 C. Reparations 
 Reparations represent one area in which the victims’ interests in justice might 
be satisfied without the participation of the accused. Individuals affected by atrocity 
crimes have consistently claimed that the victims of those crimes should be entitled to 
reparations in recognition of the harm they have suffered. Victim participants from 
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Uganda and Kenya involved in cases being adjudicated at the International Criminal 
Court identified the prospect of receiving reparations as their primary motivation for 
becoming involved in the prosecutions. 78  Their counterparts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire did not identify reparations as their main 
purpose for cooperating with the court, but they did place reparations amongst their 
reasons for participating, while also making it clear that they generally expected 
reparations following trial.79 Victim participants were not the only ones to express an 
interest in reparations. An overwhelming 97% of interviewees in the Central African 
Republic, not all of whom identified themselves as victims, believed that reparations 
for the victims of crimes committed there are an important aspect of delivering 
justice. 80  Additionally, most Iraqis responding to a 2004 survey felt that it was 
necessary to provide reparations in the form of rehabilitation and compensation to 
allow the country to move on from the crimes committed during Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.81  
 In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly recognized a right to 
reparations for victims of gross violations of international human rights law or 
international humanitarian law. 82 Reparations are meant to be proportional to the 
harm done and fall into five categories: Restitution, Compensation, Rehabilitation, 
Satisfaction and Guarantees of Non-Repetition. 83 National governments are 
responsible for reparations for crimes that can be attributed to the state, and 
individuals are responsible for paying reparations when found liable by a competent 
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court.84 Prior to the General Assembly’s decision to acknowledge victims’ right to 
reparations, victims were dependent on the individual rules applied at the 
international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal at which the matter 
pertaining to their victimisation was being adjudicated. In general these rules allowed 
for very limited forms of reparations, and monetary damages were often excluded 
entirely.85    
  Article 75 of the International Criminal Court’s Statute goes further than 
many other international criminal justice institutions and permits victims to seek 
reparations in the form of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.86 However, the 
International Criminal Court has limited the category of victims who are eligible for 
financial reparations. For the purposes of determining reparations a condition attaches 
to the third criterion to be applied when deciding if an individual qualifies as a victim. 
To be considered a victim, an individual must have been harmed during the 
commission of a crime falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court. 87  For a victim to be eligible for reparations, the accused must have been 
convicted of the crime that caused the harm to the victim.88  As a result, the interests 
of victims of atrocity crimes may be split at the reparations stage of proceedings 
between those that suffered harm as a result of a crime for which the accused was 
convicted and those that were not. 
 Victims’ eligibility for reparations is unaffected when a trial is conducted in 
absentia. Although orders to pay reparations can make up part of the sanctions 
imposed on an individual following his or her conviction, the victims can receive 
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reparations that are not paid by the convicted perpetrator. The United Nations General 
Assembly mandates that individual States should establish national programmes to 
pay reparations to victims, or to supply them with other forms of assistance should 
those guilty of causing the victims harm prove unwilling or unable to do so.89 The 
International Criminal Court also has a mechanism permitting the Trial Chambers to 
order that the Court’s Trust Fund pay the reparations awarded to the victims.90 These 
rules mean that the payment of reparations is unrelated to the presence of the accused 
because there are other entities that will be responsible for paying the necessary 
reparations to the victims.   
 The accused’s presence at trial is largely irrelevant to victims primarily 
motivated by receiving financial reparations. In fact, it could be argued that it is in the 
best interests of those victims driven by receiving reparations to proceed in absentia if 
the alternative would be the postponement of trial and an accompanying delay in the 
award of reparations. Further, the absence of the accused may benefit victims entitled 
to reparations to the extent that conviction could be more likely when the accused is 
not available to hear and challenge all of the evidence against them. In contrast, those 
victims that are not eligible for reparations are more likely to experience a sense of 
justice through the establishment of the full and complete truth and seeing the accused 
be held accountable for his or her actions. Of course, an individual victim’s 
entitlement to reparations is only determined after the trial has ended when the 
judgment is rendered. Therefore, whether reparations will constitute part of the 
victim’s sense of justice can also only be discovered after the trial. Depending on the 
verdict, this creates a situation in which a relatively small number of victims might be 
eligible for reparations. Such uncertainty makes it difficult to justify proceeding 
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against an accused in his or her absence when it remains speculative as to what impact 
the award of reparations may have on the victims’ ability to experience a sense that 
justice has been served.  
5. Conclusion  
 Providing victims with a sense of justice is one of the dominant goals of 
international criminal law. However, despite its importance, international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have been somewhat opaque about 
what needs to occur for the victims to experience justice. In response, commentators 
have suggested that for justice to be achieved victims must be provided with a remedy 
that incorporates the development of the full and complete truth relating to their 
victimisation, holding the individual perpetrators of the crimes that led to their 
victimisation accountable for their actions, and providing the victims with reparations 
in an effort to recognise the harms they have suffered and provide them with some 
redress. 
 Supplying the victims with a remedy made up of these three components is not 
possible when the accused is tried in absentia. The truth-telling component is 
compromised without the participation of the accused because he or she often 
possesses information that is fundamental to establishing the full and complete truth 
about a situation. Additionally, an absent accused cannot apologise for his or her 
behaviour, a step that is necessary for some victims to feel as if justice has been 
served. Full accountability can also not be achieved if the accused is not present. For 
many victims, the condemnation of the accused does not deliver sufficient 
accountability if it is not accompanied by punishment. An absent accused cannot be 
punished, thus thwarting the sense of justice sought by the victims. In contrast, trial in 
absentia does not threaten the ability of the victims to receive reparations. The 
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International Criminal Court has set up mechanisms whereby the victims will still 
receive reparations following the conviction of the accused regardless of whether he 
or she was present during the trial. Therefore, the accused’s presence during trial may 
be immaterial to a victim primarily motivated by receiving reparations.  
 On the whole, trials in absentia can deliver no more than a partial form of 
justice to the victims. In particular, their interests in truth and accountability are 
fundamentally compromised if the accused is not present. The inability of trials in 
absentia to provide the victims with a complete sense of justice suggests that 
proceeding in the accused’s absence should be avoided, as it is not in the interests of 
the victims. This is even more true when the disadvantage such trials impose upon the 
accused is taken into account. In the absence of a clear benefit to the victims it is 
difficult to justify conducting trials in absentia in light of the detriment they inflict 
upon the fair trial rights of the accused.  
 
 
 
